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This paper explores how the elimination of Madagascar’s Marketing Board (MB) in 
1995 affected prices paid to farmers, incentives, and regional indicators of poverty 
and inequality. After steadily losing market share, Madagascar has been able to 
regain some of the lost ground since the mid-1990s. Margins between FOB and 
farmgate prices have spectacularly narrowed down, but this effect is dwarfed by 
that of world-price volatility. A counterfactual analysis based on a model of 
Cournot competition between vanilla traders suggests that whatever limited 
competition there is among them has contributed to raise purchase prices and the 
c a s h  i n c o m e  o f  v a n i l l a  f a r m e r s .  H o w e v e r  t h e  e f f e c t  o n  f a r m e r s '  c o n s u m p t i o n  
remains small because a large part of it is self-consumed. The effect on aggregate 
measures of poverty and inequality is even smaller, even at the regional level. After 
taking into account the reduction in Madagascar's monopoly power on the world 
vanilla market implied by the elimination of the MB, the induced rise in producer 
prices is estimated to have lifted about 20,000 individuals out of poverty.  
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In most low-income countries and particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), 
poverty is above all a rural phenomenon. Thus, reducing poverty means first and 
foremost raising the incomes of farmers. Although all farmers should ultimately 
benefit from pro-market reforms, those engaged in the production of cash crops, 
in particular export ones, are most susceptible to be reached by the trade reforms 
adopted by many SSA countries since the 1990s. However, although the failure of 
pre-reform policies is by now well documented, much uncertainty remains on the 
effect of those reforms.  
 
The wave of pro-market reforms of the 1990s appeared against a backdrop of 
widespread failure in government intervention. Although sometimes justified on 
theoretical grounds (as in the case of vanilla), marketing boards and stabilization 
funds led to ill-fated outcomes documented in a growing body of well-
documented case studies (see e.g. Krueger, Schiff and Valdes, 1988; Schiff and 
Valdes, 1992; Jaffee and Morton, 1995, McMillan et al. 2003, Baffes, 2005). 
Reasons behind the failures are multiple. Export crops are often extracted from a 
narrow geographic and economic base, meaning few supplier countries and often, 
also, few intermediaries in the export trade. Those situations had a high potential 
for strategic interaction over the appropriation of rents. Typically, particularly in 
SSA after independence, government intervention in the form of marketing 
boards ostensibly meant to exploit monopoly power externally and shelter farmer 
incomes from world-price volatility internally. However, weak public institutions 
associated with the failure of farmers to organize for the defense of their interests 
meant a widening wedge between FOB and farmgate prices, the difference being 
appropriated by various combinations of organized groups. In particular, export 
structures specialized in “point-source” (as opposed to diffuse) natural resources 
such as vanilla proved strongly associated with weak public institutions and low 
growth (see Isham et al., 2005).   
 
Throughout the 1990s, along with complementary sectoral reforms (e.g. 
privatization of processing, removal of price controls and taxes), marketing 
boards and stabilization funds were largely eliminated throughout SSA, as was 
the case for vanilla. In retrospect, those reforms have met with varying degrees of 
success. If reform appraisal is sometimes complicated by the policies of 
importing countries (as in the case of cotton), domestic reforms deemed 
necessary have often been either slow, as in the case of the four major West 
African cotton producers (see Baffes, 2005), or controversial, as in the case of 3 
 
cashew nuts in Mozambique (McMillan et al. 2003). Lacking the necessary 
household surveys before and after the reforms, it is hard to know how rural 
poverty has been affected by these reforms. With household surveys straddling 
the reform period during which the marketing board was eliminated, however, 
Madagascar’s vanilla reform is an exception. 
 
Madagascar's vanilla policy since independence is in many ways typical of a 
pattern common to large parts of SSA, having gone through three successive 
phases. Throughout the colonial period, the vanilla market had been marred by 
price instability, low farmgate prices, and collusion among traders. Right after 
independence, the Government of President Tsiranana intervened in a bid to 
bring more stability and equity in the distribution of the gains from the vanilla 
trade (sound economic arguments could also be invoked in favor of public 
intervention in the market). A vanilla stabilization fund was created, prices were 
guaranteed, and a cartel was formed in 1962 with the Comores and the Réunion, 
with the objective of taking advantage of the region's market power over the 
world's second most expensive spice. Government intervention initially brought 
about positive results, with exports up by a factor of five in the 15  years following 
independence (Blarel and Dolinsky, 1995).  
 
However things turned for the worse in the mid-1970s after the Socialist 
revolution of President Didier Ratsiraka. Policy capture, rent-seeking, 
inefficiency, and corruption were the hallmarks of this era, in Madagascar as in 
so many other SSA countries at the time. Export taxation became confiscatory, 
with farmers receiving less than 8% of vanilla’s FOB price. On the world market, 
the cartel’s overpricing policy encouraged Indonesia's successful entry. By the 
early 1990s, the golden-egg goose had been all but killed, and in 1995 the 
government finally adopted the reforms long advocated by donors: elimination of 
the stabilization fund, phasing out of the export tax, and limitation of public 
intervention to coordination and non-intrusive forms of quality control. The ten 
years since reform have featured renewed turbulence on the market and changes 
in the distribution of the gains from trade, which this paper purports to study.  
 
Vanilla in Madagascar is a particularly interesting case to study the hurdles that 
reforms must overcome to be successful. The characteristics of the vanilla market 
and of vanilla preparation suggest significant externalities and market failures 
(e.g. asymmetric quality information) that justify intervention of the type that 
was initially set up. So if opportunistic behavior could be controlled, cooperation 
among agents involved in the value chain leading to export would be optimal 4 
 
both to overcome market failures and to exploit its monopoly power on high-
quality (“Bourbon”) vanilla.  
 
Thus, put in historical perspective the argument for reform was not a welfare one, 
as transparent cooperation between all domestic agents would have been ―taking 
the market-failure arguments at face value and putting the political 
environment’s realities aside― Madagascar’s first best. Instead, the argument 
was essentially (i) a comparison of second-bests and (ii) of a distributional 
nature.  
 
It was a comparison of second-bests because the pre-reform state of play was very 
far from the cooperative optimum, as the marketing board simultaneously 
expropriated vanilla farmers through very low farmgate prices while setting the 
FOB price substantially above even the static revenue-maximizing level (de Melo 
et al., 2001). The marketing board’s irrational behaviour implied that the 
argument for reform was to relace the unsustainable over-exploitation of a 
dwindling market power by its under-exploitation in an imperfect-competition 
equilibrium on the domestic intermediation market.  
 
The distributional aspect of the argument involved the redistribution of rents 
from urban elites (intermediaries and political beneficiaries) toward farmers. 
However even at this high level of simplicity the argument was less than 
straightforward as vanilla-growing farmers, although poor in absolute terms, 
were relatively high up in the distribution of rural incomes. So ironically reform, 
if successful, had the potential to widen rural income inequality (although, 
according to our results, it did not).  
 
We attempt in this paper to trace the reform’s effects on rural incomes through a 
two-pronged strategy. First, we look at price, quantity and income-distribution 
statistics in the vanilla region. It turns out that the statistically traceable impact is 
negligible for several reasons. First, the data is obviously spotty and the sample of 
vanilla farmers is small. Second, volatility in world prices is so large that it 
drowns the faint signal from the reform. 
 
This observation prompted us to complement the household-based appraisal 
with a counterfactual experiment in which we compare the current equilibrium 
with what would be obtained, ceteris paribus, with current market conditions but 
under the old export-monopoly-cum-export-tax regime. For this, we use a simple 
simulation model of the vanilla market in which two countries (Madagascar and 5 
 
Indonesia) with atomistic suppliers and imperfectly-competitive domestic traders 
adjust to policy changes, in this case the resuscitation of Madagascar’s marketing 
board and export tax. Comparing the two outcomes (actual and simulated) 
plausibly establish that farmgate prices got a substantial boost from the 
elimination of the export monopoly and tax. Once re-injected into estimates of 
the distribution of income, however, the induced producer-price changes failed to 
generate large effects. The reason, in our view, is simply that cash income is small 
in the overall consumption of rural households, so price changes can only have 
small effects unless implausibly large quantity reactions are assumed. 
 
Section 2 describes and analyzes the evolution of the vanilla market in light of 
Madagascar’s policies.  We start by describing the market failures and 
externalities that justify intervention (section 2.1) then recall the different phases 
in Madagascar’s policies (section 2.2). Section 3 turns to an assessment of the 
reforms’ effects. Section 3.1 analyzes evidence from Madagascar’s four household 
surveys, while Section 3.2 presents the results from the simulation analysis. 
Section 4 concludes.                          
 
 
2. Madagascar’s vanilla market 
 
Smuggled out of Mexico by Cortes in 1520, vanilla was introduced to the 
Réunion, then called Ile Bourbon, around 1793, but without the complementary 
bee that carried out the pollination. Vanilla production had to wait for the 
discovery of hand pollination in 1836. From then on, its cultivation for export to 
the Metropole was encouraged by colonial authorities, although for technical 
reasons, unlike other tropical crops its production could never be carried out in 
large plantations.  
 
Low in bulkiness, vanilla has a high unit value and is highly differentiated across 
origins. Madagascar’s vanilla is considered high-quality because of its high 
vanillin content (1.5% to 2%), and substitutability is low between beans of 
different origins (“Bourbon”, which denotes beans from Madagascar, Comoros 
and Réunion, vs. the Mexican, Java, and Bali’s “Bourbon-like” quality). Vanilla is 
the only spice that benefits from a “Standard of Identity” helping to shield it from 
competition by substitutes. Synthetic vanilla, which is cheaper than the natural 
one, accounts for the bulk of the overall vanilla market (about 20’000 tons per 
year, of which natural accounts for 10-15%). Tonnages on the natural vanilla 6 
 
market have hovered between 1’500 and 2’500 tons per year worldwide with no 
clear trend (Figure 1).2 
 
Figure 1 



















































Source: Blarel and Dolinsky, COMTRADE.  
 
2.1 The vanilla sector: stylized facts3 
 
2.1.1 Organization and market structure 
 
Figure 2 shows that the production of vanilla beans consists of three stages: (i) 
vanilla growing, which produces the “green” beans; (ii) curing, the stage at which 
                                                 
2 Like other primary products, natural vanilla faces a constant threat from technical change. For 
instance, a German  flavor and biotech company, Symrise, was recently reported to have made 
advances in the development of natural vanillin by fermentation with genetically modified 
bacteria of Eugenol, the conventional (and cheap) source of artificial vanillin. Although European 
hostility toward GMOs has convinced Symrise’s management to put its GM vanillin project 
temporarily on hold, once on the market, this technology could increase competition for natural 
vanilla (see www.genet-info.org). 
3 This section draws from de Melo et al. (2000) and Blarel and Dolinsky (1995). Ecott (2005) 
narrates the fascination with vanilla since the time when the Aztecs demanded vanilla as a tax 
from the people of the central and high plateaus of the country we now call Mexico. In addition to 
a history of vanilla’s origins and its development, his book describes in great details the 
organization of vanilla production and its use by the flavoring industry (see the narrative of his 
visit to the Nielsen-Massey factory (Ecott 2004, pp. 11-19).  7 
 
it develops its quality (flavor profile and natural vanillin content); (iii) packing 
(sorting, grading, and tying in small homogenous bunches). Each stage requires 
specific skills.  
 
Figure 2 
















Growing is highly labor-intensive, as crop husbandry requires 260 man-days per 
hectare during the first year and about 460 during the 4 to 8 years where plants 
reach maturity. Pruning and weeding are then supplemented by hand-pollination 
―which means that each flower on the vine has to be pollinated by hand and at 
different times― and harvesting. With few purchased inputs, entry and exit costs 
are low although plants require over three years to become productive and rather 
exacting growing conditions (small tracts of rich soil under the shade of trees).  
 
Curing entails dipping beans in near-boiling water, then triggering an enzymatic 
reaction by alternate heating and “sweating”, which means boxing the beans and 
exposing them to sunlight. The process is repeated 10 to 20 times before the 
beans are left to dry outdoors for 2-3 months. By then, they possess a uniform 
dark color and strongly smell of vanilla. 
 
Once cured, vanilla beans are prepared, packed and stored in order to keep their 
flavor, a stage that is peculiar to Indian-Ocean producers. The storage process, 
which can last up to two years, is risky, as vanilla can mold and weekly 











compounded by the cost of maintaining a high-value stock. Though it need not be 
the case, packers often export, and importers from the three main importing 
countries ―the USA, France, and Germany― keep close and lasting marketing 
contacts with exporters. 
 
Several of a bean’s quality characteristics are unobservable and largely 
determined by growing conditions, time of harvest, and the curing process. This 
asymmetric information can make it tempting for individual growers and/or 
curers to free-ride, in particular by early harvest, giving rise to a prisoner’s 
dilemma.4 The resulting market failure could in principle be addressed by a 
variety of market mechanisms, including vertical integration, branding, or 
industry standards.  
 
As a matter of fact, vertical integration between farming and processing is 
virtually nonexistent. If incentives to vertically integrate between curers and 
packers are stronger to overcome information asymmetries, they are still limited 
because the activities require specific skills. In the absence of vertical integration, 
the industry has developed weaker mechanisms to alleviate adverse-selection 
issues, such as the introduction of identification marks that remain visible after 
curing.  
 
Virtually all packers have traditionally been Malagasy companies, some owned by 
ethnic Chinese. Although in the mid-1990s there were about 45 packers, five  of 
them largely controlled the business (Blarel and Dolinsky, 1995), and the top 
three exporters accounted for two thirds of Madagascar’s exports. This high 
concentration arguably resulted as much from government policies and rent-
seeking as from economic rationality (marketing externalities and the like).  
 
 
2.1.2 Vanilla farming 
 
We now turn to a characterization of vanilla farms on the basis of Madagascar’s 
four household surveys (EPM under their French acronym standinf for “Enquêtes 
Permanentes de Ménages”): 1993, 1997, 1999 and 2001. Although they are not 
                                                 
4 Five months after flowering, vanilla beans have reached their optimal size but contain less than 
1% of vanillin. In order to reach a vanillin content of around 2% (the norm for Bourbon vanilla) 
the beans must be harvested at least eight months after flowering. Fringe traders can thus be 
tempted to compete on collection dates. That is, if trader i collects at date t, trader j has an 
incentive to collect at date t-1. Depending on his discount rate, the farmer can be induced, in 
equilibrium, to sell his vanilla too early—though this competition can only take place over a short 
period-- leading to rent dissipation pretty much like in patent races.   9 
 
strictly comparable because of differences in coverage, information from those 
surveys is helpful to identify correlates of vanilla farming that can help 
understand who the vanilla farmers are. Up to 200 vanilla-growing households 
were included in each survey.  
 
Table 1 describes the geographical distribution of farming activities.  Vanilla 
farming is concentrated on about 30,000 ha of plantations in the so-called SAVA 
zone (Sambava, Antalaha, Vohémar and Andapa) in the North-Eastern province 
of Antsiranana, with smaller numbers in the Toamasina province.5  
 
Table 1 
Agricultural population by main crop and region, 1998 
Crop/Region Antananarivo Mahajanga Fianarantsoa Toamasina Antsiranana Toliary 
 






   Rice  22.4  11.1  26.7  18.3  12.9  8.7  2,804,244  30.9 
   Other food 
crops 
40.4 7.0  14.9 13.4  5.8 18.5  4,402,227  48.5 
Sub-total 
food crops 
33.4 8.6  19.5 15.3  8.6 14.7  7,206,471  79.5 
   Sugar cane  7.3  18.0  32.5  21.3  10.6  10.2  422,267  4.7 
   Cotton  0.0  25.0  0.0  8.2  4.1  62.7  20,783  0.2 
   Tobacco  22.6  24.0  33.4  5.0  2.2  12.8  82,244  0.9 
   Peanuts  27.0  8.7  30.4  5.9  2.0  26.1  575,794  6.3 
Sub-total 
ind. crops 
18.6 13.7  30.9  11.8  5.3 19.7  1,101,088  12.1 
   Coffee  1.2  3.2  41.2  32.8  19.9  1.6  480,897  5.3 
   Vanilla  0.0  3.4  0.5  17.1  79.0  0.0  93,796  1.0 
   Pepper  0.0  0.9  70.0  11.3  17.6  0.1  54,230  0.6 
   Cloves  0.0  3.7  7.3  80.6  8.4  0.0  127,908  1.4 
   Cocoa  0.0  1.2  0.0  3.9  94.9  0.0  5,883  0.1 
Sub-total 
export crops 
0.8 3.1  32.2  37.1  25.6  1.0  762,714  8.4 
Total 28.9  8.7 22.0  16.7  9.6  14.1  9,070,273  100 
Source: World Bank (2001) 
 
Because of its labor-intensive characteristics, vanilla is ill-suited for large-scale 
plantations. The number of farms involved in vanilla production fluctuates 
between 50,000 and 100,000.6 Interestingly, Figure 3 shows that, compared to 
the average across all agricultural activities, concentration in vanilla farming is 
less than the EPM’s average (compare with annex table A1). This may be due to 
                                                 
5 Press sources report that vanilla production has also recently started in the island’s South-East 
region (Manakara, Vohipeno, Farafangana, Vangaindrano) as a response to the collapse of coffee 
prices, but is still embryonic at around 100 ha. See http://www3.clicanoo.com. 
6 Data from Madagascar’s EPMs suggests a figure around 90'000 with a substantial error margin 
because of imperfect stratification. A producer organization quotes 70'000 farmers in 2004. 10 
 
the fact that vanilla requires special conditions that may not apply to a farm’s 
entire land, however small. 
 
Figure 3 













































Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for vanilla farmers compared to the EPM’s 
average which are given in annex table A1. It can be seen that most individual 
characteristics are close to nationwide averages except for a higher proportion in 
the “medium remoteness” category and, more importantly, for incomes which 
stands 15% higher. Given the very low nationwide average, this is not much, 
though it implies that improvements in producer prices received by vanilla 
farmers could contribute to widen rural inequality rather than reduce it.  
 
Table 2 
Descriptive statistics, vanilla farming 




Sample size  9’504  578 
Family size  5.12  5.08 
HH head gender (proportion of HHs in category)   
Male 0.85  0.87 
Female 0.15  0.13 
HH head education (proportion of HHs in category)  
None 0.31  0.25 
Primary   0.54  0.58 
Secondary 0.16  0.16 
Cropland surface (ha)  1.51  2.72 
Land tenure (proportion of HHs in category)   11 
 
         Owned   77.68  79.54 
         Sharecropping  4.42  5.45 
         Rented   3.82  3.30 
% hholds w/outstanding loan  4.18  1.75 
Remoteness (proportion of HHs in category)   
Low 0.37  0.26 
Medium 0.43  0.57 
High 0.20  0.17 
Expenditure per capita     
Thousand Malagasy Francs 102.92  126.15 
US dollars at PPP  27.78  30.32 
Share of livestock sales in cash income  0.22  0.06 
Share of crop sales in full income b/  0.14  0.32 
First-crop share in total harvest  0.58  0.49 
Source: EPM, 1993-2001 
 
Further information on vanilla farmers can be extracted from the household 
surveys by looking at both “participation” decisions (whether or not to grow 
vanilla at all, a binary variable) and output decisions (how much of vanilla to 
grow, a continuous variable). For this we estimate a standard two-stage selection 
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where yi is the log of farm i’s vanilla output and Ii is equal to one when farm i 
grows vanilla. X is a vector of household characteristics likely to influence a 
farmer’s portfolio choice whereas Z is a vector of household and community 
characteristics ―including location― likely to influence a farmer’s decision or 
ability to grow vanilla at all. Identification of the selection equation comes from 





                                                 
7 We chose to estimate a selection model because omitted variables such as a farmer’s ability or 
equipment may influence both his decision to grow vanilla and how much to grow, which implies 
that  () 12 cov , 0. uu ≠   12 
 
Table 3 
Estimation results, vanilla farming regression 




HH size  0.18**  0.04 
 [2.09]  [0.40] 
HH head age  -3.22  -2.66 
 [1.54]  [1.22] 
HH head age squared  0.46  0.40 
 [1.64]  [1.34] 
AV HH members age  0.21**  0.05 
 [2.40]  [0.62] 
HH head schooling  0.03**  0.02* 
 [2.31]  [1.74] 
HH average schooling  0.03 0.01 
 [1.59]  [0.45] 
Cropland size  0.11**  0.28*** 
 [1.99]  [4.65] 
Owner 0.05  0.40** 
 [0.28]  [2.16] 
Sharecropper -0.63*  0.09 
 [1.67]  [0.28] 
Tenant a/  0.15  -0.33 
 [0.56]  [1.19] 
Past price change b/  0.29  -2.65*** 
 [0.30]  [4.08] 
Past price volatility c/  -0.27*** -0.26*** 
 [3.10]  [5.52] 
Vanilla price d/  -0.08***   
 [7.12]   
Input store    -0.57 
   [1.58] 
Bank   0.74*** 
   [3.57] 
Temp. amplitude    -0.13 
   [1.19] 
Hurricanes  -0.78*** 
   [5.99] 
Farmers association    0.34* 
   [1.72] 13 
 
Share agri. pop.    0.04*** 
   [3.57] 
Transport cost    0.00*** 
   [3.21] 
National road    0.23 
   [1.19] 
vanilla region    3.23*** 
   [6.26] 
1997 1.01***  0.66** 
 [3.57]  [2.12] 
1999 0.61**  0.81*** 
 [2.13]  [2.63] 
2001 0.65**  0.19 
 [2.51]  [0.57] 
Constant 7.50*  -4.06 
 [1.83]  [1.02] 
Observations            7'674  
ρ -0.485   
 (0.134)   
σ 0.952   
 (0.067)   
λ -0.462   
   (0.148)    
Notes 
a/ Omitted category: landless farmers tilling community land 
b/ Preceding 3-year change in output-weighted Laspeyres price index 
c/ Preceding 3-year standard deviation in output-weighted Laspeyres price index 
d/ Residual of unit-value regression on individual/local characteristics (see Table 6 below) 
 
As expected, the output equation gives positive and significant estimates for labor 
and land. However as the equation’s “land” variable is the farm’s overall land 
holdings rather than vanilla acreage, the estimated coefficient cannot be used to 
retrieve the marginal product of land. Education seems to raise the productivity 
of factors, and the effect is estimated precisely. Aggregate price volatility has a 
negative effect, possibly because with nonexistent capital markets price shocks 
impair a farmers’ ability to save and invest.8  
 
                                                 
8 The EPM reports very little access to credit. However, as noted elsewhere in this paper, this 
should be taken cautiously as farmers may fail to report pre-financing of the harvest as credit. 
This said, pre-financing of a harvest alleviates short-run liquidity problems but is not a substitute 
for investment credit to buy tools or seeds. 14 
 
As for the selection equation (a probit on vanilla = 1), remarkably the location 
variable (vanilla region dummy variable for Antsiranana and Toliari) does not kill 
the explanatory power of household or community characteristics. Schooling 
again has a positive and significant effect. Farm size, whose influence on output 
was measured imprecisely in the output equation, is now highly significant in 
determining a farmer’s choice to grow vanilla. One possible interpretation is that 
vanilla production is a sort of luxury for farms with enough land to grow other 
(food) crops. Ownership of land seems also to matter, possibly because the 
relatively long maturing of vanilla plants (three years) requires some security of 
title.9 The negative coefficient on past price changes suggests a substitution effect 
between crops (the variable is an output-weighted average of past changes in all 
producer prices), although it may simply be that vanilla farmers also produce 
other crops whose prices happened to go down in the sample period.  Price 
volatility in previous years is again a negative and significant correlate, probably 
for the reasons noted above.  
 
Turning to market-related characteristics, the presence of a nearby bank which 
proxies access to credit while being arguably exogenous to an individual farmers’s 
decision to grow vanilla has a positive and significant effect, suggesting that 
access to credit may have something to do with the decision to grow vanilla. 
However not much should be made of this given that vanilla farming does not 
require purchased inputs. The positive coefficient on the “farmers association” 
variable suggests that vanilla farmers are more organized than others, something 
that can be of importance in the bargaining with traders, although the effect is 
picked up with little precision.  
 
 
                                                 
9 Few farmers in Madagascar actually have secure land titles.  15 
 
2.2 Madagascar’s vanilla policy, 1960-2003  
 
Madagascar’s vanilla policy has gone through three successive phases since 
independence, the first two following a pattern common to much of SSA. 
Throughout the colonial period (not covered here), the vanilla market had been 
marred by price instability, low farmgate prices, and collusion among traders. 
Interestingly, the price volatility, trader concentration, and hands-off 
government policy which were the hallmarks of the colonial period ―and 
prompted government intervention after independence― also characterize the 
current, post-reform regime. One essential difference, though, is that the 
contestability of the worldwide vanilla market has increased, making a swing of 
the pendulum back to interventionism unlikely. 
 
Phase 1 (1960-75). Right after independence, the Government of President 
Tsiranana intervened, setting up institutions with a twin objective: (i) correcting 
market failures and externalities in a bid to develop world demand for vanilla, 
and (ii) bring more stability and equity in the distribution of the gains from 
vanilla trade. 10 A Vanilla Stabilization Fund (VSF—CAVAGI under its French 
acronym) was created together with a licensing committee overseeing export 
trade. At all stages of the production process described above, prices were set by 
the authorities according to a cost-plus formula, the différentiel. Under this 
institutional set-up, the VSF was committed to buy all production at a pre-
specified price and to stock it. Curers, packers and exporters had to obtain a 
license to operate and the date when the season for selling green vanilla was 
allowed to start, was set by decree.  
 
As described by Blarel and Dolinsky (1995), the government’s primary objective 
was to establish conditions for an orderly market that would continue to rely on 
the private sector, notably by setting up the regulatory foundations for an 
interprofessional vanilla organization (GNIV). Nonetheless, from the start, the 
registration of packers-exporters was also intended to limit competition and 
entry, an objective that was surely favored by established incumbents.  
 
                                                 
10 At the production stage, measures included the registration of vanilla growers, regulation of the 
marketing season for green vanilla to prevent harvesting before maturity, and the branding 
process described above. At the curing stage, registration required compliance with minimum 
quality standards ―essentially not to purchase immature vanilla beans. Packers-exporters also 
had obligations (purchase all vanilla beans on the market and store them with exports controlled 
by a quality department) which were overseen by a licensing committee. In the early years, the 
licensing committee which also oversaw the activities of the GNIV and the VSF was collegial, 
being composed of representatives from the private sector and the government.    16 
 
Figure 4 











































































Source: Blarel and Dolinsky (2000), COMTRADE (mirror statistics), authors' calculations. 
 
During this phase, a cartel was also formed in 1962 with the Comoros and the 
Réunion, the “Vanilla Alliance”. Its objective was to take advantage of the region’s 
huge market power over the world’s second most expensive spice, but also to 
correct externalities and bring the collective action necessary to develop the 
market by generic market promotion in the major consuming countries, and to 
insure quality. In the mid-seventies, the cartel’s worldwide market share was 
above 80%.  
 
As shown in figure 4, government intervention initially brought about positive 
results, with the world market expanding rapidly and Madagascar exports up by a 
factor of five in the fifteen years following independence. It is also the phase 
when Madagascar established its lead in the market for vanilla (see figure 5). 
Blarel and Dolinsky (p. 295) conclude that this first phase was successful both on 
equity grounds, as the FOB price was about equally divided between growers, 
packers, and the GOM/VSF, and on efficiency grounds as the farmers’ supply 
response was strong and quality maintained. 
 17 
 
Phase 2 (1975-95). Starting in the mid-1970s, the Socialist revolution of 
President Didier Ratsiraka took the country into a State-led import-substitution 
development strategy that rapidly threw the vanilla sector, like the rest of the 
economy, into disarray. Although the institutional setup remained largely 
unchanged, policy became increasingly prone to rent-seeking, inefficiency, and 
corruption.  
 
Growers were required to hold three-year licenses and processor-stockers annual 
ones, both granted by the Ministry of Trade which also hand-picked small 
numbers of them (38 in 1989, 13 in 1990) for participation in the export trade. 
The Ministry also fixed the export quota allotted to each authorized processor-
stocker. Again under the direction of the GOM, the VSF (CAVAGI) purchased the 
largest part of the crop to market it directly, fixing the price for all export 
transactions, its own and those of the authorized exporters.  
 
Export quotas were allocated to politically favored traders as were licenses for 
curing and packing, resulting in a concentration of market power in the hands of 
a few. The tri-partite decision process involving growers, packers-stockers and 
the GOM which had been put in place after independence collapsed as virtually 
all decisions were taken by the Ministry of Trade.  
 
The replacement of the cooperative management system put in place under the 
previous government by centralized and politically-motivated decisions led to 
increasingly distorted outcomes. Internally, export taxation became confiscatory, 
peaking at 82% of the pre-tax export price in the early 1990s with the fraction of 
the export price received by farmers squeezed to less than 8% (see table 5 and 
Blarel and Dolinsky, p. 292). In spite of two exchange-rate corrections, in 1987 
and in 1994, extortionary taxation was compounded, like in many other SSA 
countries, by currency overvaluation.  Low producer prices discouraged 
plantation and made it all but impossible for farmers to renew plant material and 
maintain quality. It also contributed, albeit on a limited scale because vanilla 
farmers were in small numbers, to the countryside’s descent into poverty 
documented by Paternostro et al. (1999).  
 
Externally, attempts to over-exploit monopoly rents led to the allocation of 
unused export quotas across exports from the Indian Ocean cartel. Even putting 
dynamic considerations aside, simulations suggest that CAVAGI’s price was 
about twice the static welfare-maximizing level, and a third above the revenue-
maximizing level (de Melo et al., 2001), implying welfare losses adding up to 18 
 
about 1% of GDP.  Illegal trade flourished, while the cartel’s high prices 
encouraged the entry of Indonesia into the market (see figure 5). 11  
 
Figure 5 


















Blarel and Dolinsky (2000), COMTRADE (mirror statistics), authors' calculations.  
Notes: 
ROW stands for world exports minus Madagascar and Indonesia. 
 
Worst of all, declining revenues meant that the cost of keeping exploding 
inventories (as the cartel’s high prices discouraged demand) escalated beyond 
what could be financed out of CAVAGI’s revenue. In the end, three quarters of the 
stock of inventories, which by 1990 exceeded four years’ worth of export under 
good times, were ultimately burnt, an extraordinary waste given the high unit 
value of vanilla and the extreme poverty of the farmers whose output was thus 
destroyed.12  
 
                                                 
11 Indonesia’s entry into the vanilla sector was essentially driven by market incentives rather than 
a grand plan of the Government of Indonesia, which had no particular policy in that sector. 
Indonesia’s vanilla production was kickstarted by the vanilla shortage of the 1970s (de Melo et al., 
2000).  A key difference between the two major players, is that Indonesia did not tax vanilla 
exports. 
12 Examples of the corruption surrounding the operation of CAVAGI are described in Ecott 
(chapter 13, especially pp 220-223). This type of confiscatory policy extended beyond vanilla to 




































Phase 3 (since 1995). This third phase, which extends to this day, finally saw 
donor policy advice (see e.g. World Bank 1991) taken on board. In 1995 the GOM 
eliminated CAVAGI and the licensing system. Licenses were still required of 
processors, but the system is a lot less constraining than it used to be. The impact 
effect of CAVAGI’s elimination was a sharp reduction of the world price which 
settled roughly at the Indonesian unit cost (still three times the Malagasy unit 
cost). Thus, with CAVAGI gone the Indonesians’ rents were gone, too, although 
Malagasy producers still enjoyed a substantial rent due to their lower unit costs. 
Fixed prices for producers were progressively lifted between 1995 and 97.  
 
CAVAGI was eliminated and export taxes progressively phased out, following a 
pattern common to large chunks of SSA where clumsy attempts to exploit 
monopoly power over commodity markets led to similarly unsuccessful policies.  
 
The State’s role is now essentially confined to sanitary/quality inspections and to 
setting the date and place of vanilla marketing every year.13 Although this power 
alone has been shown elsewhere to be a possible vehicle for extortion,14 the 
motivation here seems to be merely to discourage the marketing of non-mature 
vanilla (WTO 2002).15 Efforts aimed at quality improvements are financed by the 
EU’s Stabex fund in cooperation with the GES (Groupement des entrepreneurs de 
la SAVA) under a five-million euros project extending from 1997 to 2006.  
 
                                                 
13 Arrêté interministériel n° 11672/2004 of June 21, 2004 (Agriculture and Trade ministries of 
Malagasy Republic) prohibits the sales and exports of more than 100g of vanilla less than six 
months after harvest. Annual ministerial decisions fix legal harvesting dates and stocking periods. 
In addition, the Sava region recently issued an Arrêté establishing minimum quality standards for 
vanilla, partly in response to the entry of fringe, low-quality producers during the high-price 2004 
campaign. We are grateful to Sofia Bettencourt for pointing this out to us.  
14 For instance, Chad’s cotton monopoly uses its power to set date and place for the marketing of 
cotton separately for each village to extort bribes from village associations. In the case of 
Madagascar, following the disintegration of the Soviet bloc, the weakening of President Ratsiraka 
in his second term (1996-2001) prevented him from laying his hands on vanilla which had 
accounted for up to 10% of national income during his first tenure as President (see  Ecott (2004,  
chp. 13)). 
15 Government regulation of market opening dates is (at least in principle) necessary because of 
Government regulation is called on to control this potential market failure. Whether Malagasy 
authorities succeed in their regulatory function is an open question, as Madagascar’s vanilla 
market is less than fully transparent. According to a 2003 article published by Radio-France 
International on the web, about a third of Madagascar’s vanilla might be sold on the parallel 
market, some of which as part of money-laundering schemes (Péguy 2003). Traders associations 
also complain that the prohibition of early collection makes harvests easy targets for organized 
crime. Large-scale thefts and armed ambushes of traders were reported in the local press during 
the high-price period of 2001-3. The situation was apparently serious enough to affect the 
harvest’s pre-financing by foreign buyers. 20 
 
Inspecting developments in the vanilla market since the reforms in 1995, three 
trends are apparent. First, recent years have been marked by a contraction of 
world exports matched by a spectacular rise in prices. Second, the decline in 
Madagascar’s market share has reversed itself during the 1990s. Third, new 
entrants are progressively overtaking Indonesia as the main competition facing 
Madagascar.  This development mirrors the early days of phase 2 when high 
prices triggered Indonesia’s entry. As shown in figure 4, the evolution of prices is 
particularly striking as they slowly eroded during 1993-98 but literally exploded 
from a low of US$21.26 in 1997 to a high of US$251.17 in 2004 (some vanilla was 
reportedly sold at 600$ per kilo in 2004), a more than ten-fold increase, only to 
collapse again in 2005 much like they had before. During the same period, trade 
volumes contracted by about two thirds, from three thousand tons to little over 
one thousand tons, as several hurricanes in Madagascar and a large-scale fire 
destroyed a substantial chunk of the worldwide vanilla production capacity. 
While exogenous factors leading to supply shortages certainly contributed to this 
development, it is unlikely that demand was sufficiently inelastic to explain such 
a reaction, suggesting some market manipulation with supply withholding to fuel 
prices. 
 
The erosion of Madagascar’s market share, which started in the 1970s as a result 
of the cartel’s high-price policy, strikingly reversed itself in the latter part of the 
1990s. Some erosion is again apparent in later years but arguably due to adverse 
weather conditions rather than a policy shift. In a sharp reversal of fortunes, the 
Asian crisis and 1997 Indonesian fire precipitated a decline in Indonesia’s market 
share that started in the early to mid-1990s. Once again, following high prices,  
partly due to climatic conditions  in Madagascar (cyclonic conditions in 2000 
followed by heavy rains in 2002)  competition from new entrants, which together 
account today for more than a third of world exports, is rising.16  Undeniably, the 
free market has certainly not stabilized the price,  and it is said that the price hike 
of 2004 which saw vanilla sold at 600$ per kilo, the food industry has substituted 
up to 30% of its purchases of natural vanilla with artificial vanillin (Ecott 2004, p. 
18).  
 
With the knowledge that cyclonic conditions and the Indonesian fire in 1997 have 
contributed to the volatility of the vanilla market during the last decade, the 
challenge is to try and detect whether the policy reforms carried out since 1995 
                                                 
16 Entrants include Costa Rica, India (whose output, at 120-130 tons, is equivalent to the 
Comoros’), Mexico, and Papua-New Guinea (around 300 tons). Uganda is also reported to be 
raising output and quality (see e.g. www.cgiar.org/foodnet).  21 
 
have had a discernible effect on the price signals received by farmers, on their 
supply response, and ultimately on their well-being.  We now confront this task 
in the two related ways mentioned in the introduction, looking for evidence from 
the household surveys in the first part of Section 3, and turning to simulations in 
the second part. 
  
 
3. Assessing the effect of reforms  
 
3.1 Prima-facie evidence from household surveys 
 
We return here to the EPM to assess the evolution of various indicators of rural 
poverty and income inequality before and after the reforms. Because the small 
sample of vanilla farmers limits the extent of statistical analysis, annex A1 reports 
several descriptive statistics on the larger sample of close to 10,000 agricultural 
households giving background on the characteristics and evolution of poverty 
and inequality in rural areas. The annex also shows various decompositions 
attempting to measure the impact of price changes since 1993 for this larger 
sample. Essentially they show that farmers at the top of the distribution 
responded better to price shocks. The decompositions also show that exporters 
faced better price incentives than other farmers over the period and that 
Madagascar imported strong price volatility during 1999-01.  
 
 
3.1.1. Prices, output and intermediation margins  
 
Before talking about “the” producer price, it is worth noting that the prices 
reported by farmers in the EPM show substantial variation across households 
(standard error over twice the mean). Such variation can come from (i) 
measurement errors, (ii) individual characteristics such as quality differences in 
the vanilla produced or the bargaining ability of farmers, or (iii) local rather than 
individual characteristics such as transport costs or the bargaining power of the 
intermediary. In order to explore these conjectures we ran OLS regressions of 
individually-reported unit values on farmer characteristics and dummy variables 
for small geographical entities (“fivondroanana”).17  
                                                 
17 OLS results are likely to have a selection bias since the price received by farmers may be 
affected by omitted variables (such as the quality of their land) that also affect their decision to be 
in vanilla production. In order to control for this we also ran a selection model in which the 
selection equation was identified by the geographical variables but the results were not different 
(which is of course not surprising since none of the individual characteristics were significant in 22 
 
 
The results, reported in Table 4, suggest little systematic variation across 
individual households but substantial variation across space, even though vanilla 
farmers are relatively concentrated. The story is probably that the bad shape of 
roads has the effect of segmenting the area into smaller sub-areas even though it 
is small to start with. However the data does not allow us to tell whether the price 
variation generated by the segmentation is in terms of transport costs or market 
power of local intermediaries. Thus, the best that can be said of the regression 
results is that they suggest that there is substantial noise in the producer-price 
variable. This should of course be kept in mind for the rest of the analysis. 
 
Table 4 
Estimation results, vanilla price regressions 
  1993  1997  1999  2001 
Ln HH size  0.118  0.226  0.188  0.215 
 (0.42)  (1.45)  (1.53)  (1.42) 
HH head age  1.094  -1.635 -2.135 -1.639 
 (0.25)  (0.43)  (0.60)  (0.43) 
HH head age 2  -0.037  0.214  0.276  0.218 
 (0.07)  (0.42)  (0.56)  (0.43) 
HH head schooling 0.044 0.010 0.004 0.009 
 (0.99)  (0.27)  (0.13)  (0.24) 
Members age  -0.075  -0.313  0.087  -0.331 
 (0.33)  (2.14)*  (0.64)  (2.30)* 
Cropland size  -0.018  0.073  -0.309  0.079 
 (0.32)  (0.70)  (1.57)  (0.76) 
Inputs 0.101  0.926  -0.388  0.922 
 (0.40)  (1.29)  (1.36)  (1.27) 
fivondroanana303 -1.115  -0.504  -1.285  -1.235 
 (8.72)**  (1.28)  (5.22)**  (5.51)** 
fivondroanana304 -1.074    -0.988  -0.649 
 (13.82)**  (5.83)**  (1.26) 
fivondroanana710 0.219  0.086    -0.654 
 (1.35)  (0.16)    (3.15)** 
fivondroanana711   0.319  0.390  -0.420 
   (0.65)  (1.70)  (1.90) 
fivondroanana712 -0.625 0.214  -0.388 -0.527 
                                                                                                                                                 
the OLS regression, so using a Heckman procedure on very small samples was unlikely to give 
better results). Remoteness and transport-cost variables were not included because they are 
collinear with fivondroanana dummies.  23 
 
 (4.24)**  (0.43)  (2.36)*  (1.98) 
fivondroanana716 -0.202  0.868  -0.336   
  (1.53) (1.77) (1.35)  
Constant 4.986  12.192  16.551  12.906 
 (0.61)  (1.73)  (2.38)*  (1.75) 
Observations 91  222  174  222 
R-squared 0.32  0.12  0.34  0.11 
 
Dependent variable: EPM-reported vanilla producer prices (unit values), uncorrected for CPI 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Number of strata: 12, Number of PSUs: 398 
For each year, fivondroanana effects are relative to the omitted one, which is the one with the 
smallest number of vanilla farmers.  
 
With this caveat in mind, can we find in the data any prima-facie evidence of the 
reform’s effects on  producer prices and intermediation margins? The elimination 
of Madagascar’s marketing board implies the replacement of a state-owned 
monopoly by a market structure for intermediaries that can be expected to be 
fairly concentrated at the outset but to become more competitive over time as 
entry is attracted by high intermediation margins. Thus, except under very 
peculiar settings, one should expect intermediation margins to narrow down over 
time, especially given that, as explained in the previous section, CAVAGI’s 
margins were vastly in excess of even a rational monopoly’s optimal level. Table 5 
shows the evolution of prices and intermediation margins over 1991-2001.  
 
Table 5 






















1991         2'000   132'743  1.51          135'620   1.47   
1992         5'000   136'363  3.67           131'161   3.81   
1993         5'000   136'182  3.67          130'555   3.83          4'062  
1994          8'450   213'532  3.96          186'325   4.54   
1995       10'000   237'090  4.22          210'557   4.75   
1996          5'150   75'216  6.85         124'044   4.15   
1997        10'500   74'789  14.04          101'230   10.37        17'788  
1998        10'500   99'031  10.60          126'767   8.28   
1999       25'000   106'650  23.44         142'435   17.55        21'950  
2000        66'250   219'897  30.13         254'324   26.05   
2001        69'828   598'189  11.67         608'232   11.48      133'559  
Source: FAO, COMTRADE, EPM.  24 
 
 
Two trends stand out in Table 5. First, prices went up sharply between 1999 and 
2001, from FMG 200’000 to 600’000 per kilogram. According to various press 
and professional sources, prices continued to climb until 2004, reaching close to 
US$150/kg, only to collapse abruptly in the fall of 2004, settling at US$60/kg 
(FMG 600’000 at the 2004 exchange rate). Prices were also oriented downward 
in 2005. The high prices of 2001-3, partly due to the fact that hurricane Hudah in 
September 1999 wiped out about a third of the region’s output and 15% of its 
stocks,18 are widely reported to have encouraged the entry of informal traders in 
the market, with consequent loss of control by established traders and 
government authorities.  
 
Second, as expected, the elimination of CAVAGI in 1995 immediately translated 
into a sharp increase in the fraction of vanilla FOB prices retained by producers, 
from a low of less than 2% in 1991 to a high of 30% in 2000.19 However, 
interestingly, this squeeze in intermediation margins abruptly reversed itself in 
2001, a year in which none of the sharp increase in export prices was retained by 
producers whose farmgate prices stayed flat.20  
 
Figure 6 shows hectares planted, yields and output of vanilla over a twenty-year 
period straddling CAVAGI’s elimination. As is obvious from the figure, there is 
little prima-facie evidence of a strong supply response to the reduction in 
intermediation margins over 1995-2001, although of course this statement can 
only be taken cautiously in the absence of a counterfactual (see next section) and 
an increase in planted areas in the Sava region did take place in 2004 according 





Figure 6 Vanilla: areas planted, yield and output, 1980-2001 
                                                 
18 See www.vanilla.com. Hurricane damage on production capacity persists for about three years, 
the plant’s maturing period. The wet season in 2002 also accounted for a poor harvest whose 
effects on supply were felt two later in 2004. 
19 The 2% figure is probably an underestimate. Blarel and Dolinsky (1995, p. 292) quote a figure of 
8% but suggest that this number is itself an upper bound, so the truth is likely to be somewhere 
between 2% and 8%.  
20 Note however that FAO farmgate prices are in all likelihood prices quoted by established 
traders.  It is possible though unverified that parallel exports were purchased from farmers at 
higher prices.  
21 The absence of a positive supply response in 2001 may also have had to do with the political 






































































Overall, the data in Figure 6 suggest is that the improvement in Madagascar’s 
market share observable in Figure 5 is likely to reflect more the slackening of the 
competitive pressure from Indonesia than a positive domestic supply response to 
the improved price signals received by Malagasy vanilla farmers. This 
interpretation should be taken cautiously. First, FAO data on planted area and 
yields is very imperfectly measured. Second, the regression results reported in 
Table 3 give a somewhat different picture. The coefficients on year effects (all 
relative to 1993) are suggestive of entry and output increases in 1997 and 1999, 
but not in 2001, the year immediately after the hurricane.22  
 
 
3.1.2 Regional Income inequality and poverty 
 
At less than 100,000 (1% of the total), the number of vanilla farmers is too small 
for vanilla policy to affect nationwide measures of inequality and poverty. 
However, as vanilla farming is concentrated in just two provinces (Antsiranana 
and, to a lesser extent, Toamasina) it makes sense to explore the evolution of 
inequality and poverty indices for those regions in order to track any possible 
aggregate effect of the 1995 change in Madagascar’s vanilla policy. Table 6 shows 
changes in selected income and price variables for the two vanilla-producing 




                                                 
22 The “hurricane” variable is the statistical frequency of hurricanes in the region. 26 
 
Table 6 
Income, wage and price changes, vanilla region, 1999-2001 













1        220'391          28'628   4.04 0.51 
2        337'558          32'135   0.35 -0.12 
3        427'348          45'412   3.99 4.83 
4        521'138           38'283   2.02 -0.44 
5        627'169        148'841   3.42 0.13 
6        735'808        101'400   2.46 0.87 
7        866'146        102'574   1.74 0.14 
8      1'066'679        114'097   1.96 0.63 
9      1'361'700        152'066   2.25 0.16 
10      2'462'838       257'644   0.69 0.91 
Notes 
a/ Ranked from poorest to richest. 
b/ Decile’s average per-capita income in real (CPI-deflated) FMG, 1999.  
c/ Decile’s average income from vanilla sales, real FMG, 1999. 
d/ 1999-2001 wage change was calculated for pseudo-panels defined by the narrowest 
geographical areas for which we had observations in both years. 
e/ Calculated as the decile’s average of the individual weighted-producer price change, itself 
calculated as  PP pw p j ij ij j
Δ= Δ ∑  where i indexes households in the decile, j indexes crops, and 
P
ij w
is the weight of crop j in household i’s income. 
 
It can be seen that income from vanilla sales represents about 10% of per-capita 
income except in deciles 4 (7%) and 5 (23%). Real wage changes over 1999-2001 
(the only period where vanilla producer prices went significantly up) show little 
reaction, with rates between 2% (toward the top of the distribution) and 4% 
(towart the bottom, a very slightly progressive evolution). The evolution of 
producer prices other than vanilla, shown in column e, is essentially noise. 
Together, these numbers suggest little spillover of the rise in vanilla producer 
prices on other prices in the region.  
 
Table 7 shows estimates of Gini indices, poverty headcount, and poverty gap for 
the vanilla region (ignore for now the simulated numbers given for 2001). 
Starting with the poverty headcount, calculated here as the number of individuals 
with full incomes (i.e. overall consumption including self-produced) lower than 
what is necessary to purchase a 2’100 calories-a-day diet at current prices (see 
Paternostro et al., 1999, for a discussion). Between 1993 and 1999, the period 27 
 
straddling the reforms, the headcount went down by about 74’485 individuals, or 
a full 17.4% of the regional population. The Gini index also showed a favorable 
trend, shrinking from 0.427 to 0.39 (only to go up again between 1999 and 2001). 
Both numbers indicate large and favorable shifts in the regional distribution of 
income which stand in contrast with the seemingly endless descent into poverty 
that characterized Madagascar over the previous quarter-century. 
 
Table 7 
Poverty headcount, Poverty gap and Gini indices, vanilla region 
 Headcount  Headcount  ratio  Poverty gap  Gini coef. 
 Actual  Counter.  Actual  Counter.  Actual  Counter.  Actual  Counter. 
93  333'879 n.a.  0.749  n.a.  0.380  n.a. 0.427  n.a. 
97  271'424  n.a. 0.596 n.a. 0.227 n.a. 0.366  n.a. 
99  259'394 n.a.  0.575  n.a.  0.213 n.a.  0.39  n.a. 
01  261'618 282'510  0.674 0.728 0.276 0.320 0.418  0.418 
 
Source: authors’ calculations from EPM. 
Headcount: number of individuals; headcount number: proportion of individuals (using EPM’s 
survey design). 
Counter. : Counterfactual values obtained from baseline scenario (σ = 4, εs = 0.5, εv = 1.0). See 
text and annex A.2 for description of the simulation model. 
 
 
The fact that this reversal takes place precisely during the reform period is 
remarkable. Before crying victory, however, one needs to take a hard look at how 
much of it can reasonably be attributed to the vanilla reforms. One can only be 
suspicious that at least some of it has little to do with the reforms for two reasons. 
First, the trend is the same nationwide. Second, vanilla output and producer 
prices evolved, in fact, unfavorably during the period 1995-98. For all its 
limitations, only a simulation-based counterfactual analysis recreating the old 
policy environment under current market conditions can give a beginning of an 
answer to the real question: how much did the reforms achieve by themselves? 
 
 
3.2 A simple counterfactual 
 
Our description of Madagascar’s vanilla sector suggests that domestic 
competition in processing and intermediation was limited both by technical 
factors and by the GOM’s policies. Internationally, competition was also limited 
with only two major producing countries, at least until recently, each producing a 
differentiated good. We exploit this characteristic of the vanilla market described 28 
 
earlier to complement the household-based descriptive analysis of the previous 
section with a counterfactual exercise based on a model of imperfect competition 
domestically and internationally. The simulation exercise is particularly useful 
here as the noise due to vanilla price volatility drowns the faint signal from policy 
reform. With limited data, counterfactual analysis can help separate the two and 
by providing orders of magnitude. 
 
Suppose then that the vanilla market can be approximated by modeling three 
types of players: a supply side with atomistic producers (farmers); a demand side 
black-boxed with a constant price-elasticity of demand for aggregate 
(Madagascar and Indonesia) natural vanilla; and a layer of imperfectly 
competitive curers-stockers-traders engaged in Cournot competition in the 
middle. In this set-up, reminiscent of the vanilla market in Madagascar, the 
taxation of exports followed during phase 2 leads to an outcome akin to double 
marginalization (see annex A2 for a detailed précis of the model and calibration 
to Madagascar and Indonesian data). Starting from observed mark-ups, we let 
the model determine the number of traders consistent with imposed behavior 
under the current policy regime of no taxation and domestic market intervention 
restricting entry. These model-generated numbers are close to the anecdotal 
evidence (about five traders).  
 
Then, in a counterfactual experiment we reduce the number of traders to a single 
one (i.e. we resuscitate the marketing board) and re-impose taxation at the pre-
reform maximum rate of 82% during phase two. Resuscitating the marketing 
board in this framework generates implied FOB and producer prices consistent 
with this policy-imposed limited competition. We then use the counterfactual 
producer prices to recalculate farmer incomes using Madagascar’s 2001 
household survey. Finally, we recompute poverty and inequality indices (poverty 
headcount, poverty gap and Gini coefficient) and compare the actual outcome  
with the counterfactual outcome. The difference in poverty headcounts is then an 
estimate of the number of individuals lifted out of poverty by the vanilla sector 
reform. 
 
The gist of the model, which is laid out formally in Annex A2, boils down to  a 
simple formula relating the share of the world price retained by Madagascar’s 
producers as a function of demand and supply elasticities and, more importantly, 
the number of local traders. Namely, letting PM be the selling price of 
Madagascar’s vanilla (whose formula is derived in the appendix), 
P
M p  its farmgate 
producer price, σ the elasticity of substitution between Madagascar’s and 29 
 
Indonesia’s vanilla, sM a market-share parameter, and 
s
M ε the elasticity of supply 
of Madagascar’s vanilla, 
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It is easily checked that θM is increasing in the elasticity of supply and in the 
number of traders, as raising either of those parameters reduces their 
monopsonistic power.  
 
The counterfactual experiment described above yields simulated values for θM, 
p
M p and XM  which we then combine with household-survey data to generate a 
simulated income distribution. Finally, we recalculate the poverty headcount and 
the poverty gap, with results shown in the last columns of Table 7 (poverty gap 
and headcount and Gini coefficient) and in Figure 7 (actual and counterfactual 
kernel density estimates of the distribution of income in the vanilla region).  
 
Figure 7 
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Source: EPM, authors calculations. 
 
Detailed results are shown in Annex Table A2. Note that the benchmark number 
of Malagasy traders consistent with observed markups under the Cournot 
assumption (
0
M n ) ranges between four and five, an estimate that is just consistent 
with evidence given in Blarel and Dolinsky (1995, p. 274) that five packers 30 
 
dominate the vanilla intermediation business. Taken at face value, this suggests 
that there was little entry since the mid-1990s or that, if there was, new entrants 
followed the incumbents' pricing policy.23  
 
Under the counterfactual, producer prices are reduced very sharply compared to 
their current values. In percent of the current FOB price, the simulated producer 
price lies between 2% and 11%, as against 22% currently. The after-tax FOB price, 
by contrast, shoots up by a factor ranging between 2.3 and 4.4. This price 
increase is obtained by a sharp contraction of volumes exported, which go down 
by a factor between 3 and 6. In accordance with intuition, Indonesian prices and 
volumes both go up (although by much less) as Indonesia free-rides on 
Madagascar’s output restrictions. These simulations, suggesting drastic effects on 
prices and quantities, no doubt provide upper bounds on the effect of change in 
the policy environment induced by the 1995 reforms.  
 
Once re-introduced in the household survey, however, the new producer prices 
turn out to have a meek effect on the distribution of income, as shown by the last 
columns of Table 7 and Figure 7. The reason is essentially that most of the 
effective consumption of Malagasy rural households is self-produced. Cash 
income represents a small part of their effective income, and vanilla is only part 
of it. Thus, even drastic price changes do not change the picture much in terms of 
poverty. Using a central scenario with a unit  elasticity of supply, a unit elasticity 
of vanilla demand and an elasticity of substitution between Malagasy and 
Indonesian varieties equal to two, the change in the poverty headcount ratio 
suggests that only about 20’000 individuals were lifted out of poverty as a result 
of the 1995 reforms. 
 
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
 
The reforms initiated in 1995 at the behest of international donors (elimination of 
the marketing board and phasing out of export taxes) put to an end two decades 
of a policy of over-exploitation of market power on the outside front and 
extortion of farmer incomes on the domestic one that was clearly unsustainable.  
 
                                                 
23 Our counterfactual experiment reduces the number of traders to one, based on the assumption 
that they colluded during the socialist era. With export quotas, they obviously had little incentive 
to compete on prices. Indeed, Blarel and Dolinky (1995) describe a process through which the 
political allocation of export licences increasingly concentrated power in the hands of a single 
exporter allowed to ship fixed quantities of vanilla alongside the State marketing board.  31 
 
Our attempt to evaluate the effects of those reforms contains both good and bad 
news. On the positive front, Madagascar has been able to regain some of the 
competitive ground it lost during the disastrous Ratsiraka era. However some of 
this competitive recovery simply reflects the (exogenous) difficulties that affected 
Indonesia, then its main competitor, in the second half of the 1990s. More 
ominously, following the recent price hike, new entrants are appearing on the 
horizon, together with bio-engineered substitutes.  It remains that little of this 
‘improvement’ in the policy environment can be traced back to higher farmer 
incomes in the household surveys. Nor have presumably better incentives for 
farmers translated into a noticeable producer response, at least according to FAO 
data which suggest that yields and planted areas have remained about flat.  
 
Because large price fluctuations in a market that has always been very volatile 
render any interpretation of prima-facie evidence difficult, we turned to a 
counterfactual experiment to assess the effect of policy reform “ceteris paribus”. 
The results, again, contain good and bad news. Producer prices seem to have 
benefited from a substantial narrowing of intermediation margins after the 
reforms and phase-out of export taxes which stood in the early 1990s at absurdly 
high levels. However, once introduced into household survey data, this 
improvement does not translate into large effects on measures of poverty and 
inequality simply because cash income from export crops is too small relative to 
self-consumption. 
 
In a nutshell, thus, our main result is that the vanilla sector reforms may have 
had a large and positive effect on producer prices (travelers in the vanilla 
producing region report a change in consumption to beer and to the purchase of 
durables like radios and bricks for construction),  but the reductions in 
intermediation margins (i) were dwarfed by the volatility of world prices and (ii) 
could not have a very large impact on farmers’ consumption simply because the 
latter is essentially self-produced.  
 
For market reforms to take hold and make a difference, two conditions must be 
met.  First, for impact effects to be substantial the economy needs to “re-
marketize”, a process that can only take time after decades of retrenchment 
under strongly anti-market policies. This is an important point. In Madagascar, 
decades of bad policies and predatory taxation have raised transaction costs to 
such prohibitive levels that the market economy has largely shrunk to urban 
areas, leaving rural households isolated and forced to rely on themselves. Once 
this has happened, reforms affecting the price signals faced by rural farmers can 32 
 
only have small effects. Only over time, as rural economies “re-marketize”, can 
reforms be expected to have quantitatively large effects. This of course does not 
mean that they do not work: rather, that they have increasing returns. 
 
Second, the farmers’ supply response must become more dynamic than what we 
either observed in the data or assumed in the simulations. This requires 
credibility and stability in the policy environment. After several changes of 
government but only modest improvements in the readability of government 
policy, much progress is still needed on that front.  
 
This case study suggests two further conclusions, the first relating to the difficult 
separation between malfunctioning markets due to excessive government 
intervention and that due to market failures. Thus, for all the evidence of 
government failure during the 1975-95 period, the reforms have created a 
regulatory vacuum in which unchecked concentration of intermediaries can lead 
to renewed exploitation of producers, although probably not to an extent 
comparable to what CAVAGI was doing. There is, indeed, plenty of anecdotal 
evidence that a large part of the price hike in 2004 was caused by strategic 
stockpiling between two large intermediaries in the sector. 
  
Second, strategic behavior in highly concentrated markets with informational 
failures can lead to largely undesired outcomes, at least from a national 
standpoint. Thus, when by 1995 the conditions that made reforms politically 
feasible were eventually met, rent extraction was largely exhausted and the world 
market had become increasingly contestable, as shown by the rising output of 
new producers. To use Margaret McMillan’s expression (McMillan 2003), by 
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The simulation model 
 
A.1 The model 
 
This annex describes the partial equilibrium simulation model used for the 
counterfactual analysis of Section 4.2. Consider first a non-parameterized 
(general) formulation. Let XM and XI be the quantities of vanilla marketed by 
Madagascar and Indonesia respectively. Let PM be the world-market price of 
Malagasy vanilla and pM its farmgate price. The inverse demand function for 
Malagasy vanilla is 
 
  ( ) ,       , ii M I PP XX iM I ==  (0.1) 
 
and the inverse supply is  
  ( ). ii i p pX =  (0.2) 
 
Let xk be the quantity of vanilla purchased and marketed by one of ni symmetric 











Let  kj jk x x − ≠ =∑ . The profit-maximization problem of Madagascar’s trader k is 
 
  () ( ) ( ) max ,
k x kM M k k I M k k k x Px xX px x x π −− =+− + ⎡ ⎤ ⎣ ⎦  (0.3) 
 
and similarly for the representative trader in Indonesia. Let 
ln / ln
D
ki k i ex P ≡∂ ∂ and 
S
ki e  be respectively the price elasticities of demand and 
input supply facing trader k in country i. Maximization of (0.3) gives a familiar 
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where ci is an intermediation cost and ti is the ad-valorem export-tax rate, if any. 
Under symmetry of traders, xki = Xi/ni, so letting 
D
M ε  and 
D
I ε  stand for the price 
elasticity of market demand in Madagascar and Indonesia respectively, 
.
D D
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It is easy to verify by implicit differentiation that the purchase price 
P
i p is an 
increasing function of the number of traders, ni, and of the elasticity of supply. In 
the former case the monopsony power of traders is reduced by large numbers 
whereas in the latter it is reduced by a flat supply curve. Note that the presence of 
an export tax acts as if there was "double marginalization". To see this, suppose 
that there were two layers of intermediaries, no intermediation cost and no tax. 
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ii NE τ = . Then the presence of the second layer of intermediaries acts like 
an ad-valorem export tax at rate τ.  
 
In order to derive an expression for 
D
i ε , we now parameterize the model. On the 
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i p is the price paid to farmers, 
S
i ε is the price elasticity of the farmers’ 
supply, and 
S
i A is a calibration parameter. This function subsumes the behaviour 
of farmers, implicitly assuming some hoarding behaviour whose intertemporal 
aspects we leave aside.  
 
On the demand side, overall utility is quasi-linear in vanilla (Xv) and an aggregate 















=+ %  (0.8) 
 
implying a constant marginal utility of income and a worldwide demand for 
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εv being its constant price elasticity and () /1
v
vv v v AA
ε εε
− =− % . The vanilla aggregate 
Xv  has the familiar CES form: 
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  () ()
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11 / 11 /
vi i i i ii XA X A X
ρσ ρ σ ββ
− − == ∑∑ (0.10) 
 
i = M, I, and  () 11 / ρ σ =− , σ being the elasticity of substitution between Malagasy 
and Indonesian vanilla on the world market, and A a calibration parameter. 
Worldwide expenditure on vanilla is 
 
  . ii i EP X =∑  (0.11) 
 
Under the assumption of two-stage budgeting, (0.10) can be maximized under 
constraint (0.11) independently of upper-level choices (between X0 and Xv), 
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Under the assumption that traders play Cournot (by which is meant that they 
take as constant the quantities marketed by both their national and foreign 
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where si is variety i’s share of the worldwide vanilla market. This expression can 
then be substituted into (0.5) to close the model. 
 
 
A.2 Calibration and initial equilibrium 
 
Intermediation cost data was provided to us by industry sources. Elasticities are 
based on the econometric estimates of de Melo, Olarreaga and Takacs (2001). 
Their point estimates are (in algebraic form)  ˆ 2.5 M ε = −  for the own-price 
elasticity of demand for Malagasy vanilla,  ˆ 1.99 I ε =  for the own-price elasticity of 
demand for Indonesian vanilla, and  ˆ 1.7 MI ε = for the cross-price elasticity, which 
they find, as expected, to be symmetric (in what follows we ignore interaction 
with the artificial vanilla market). The elasticity of substitution can be retrieved 
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where tildes indicate that elasticities are in algebraic rather than absolute-value 
form. So 
11 1 1 ˆ 1.933.
2.5 1.7 1.7 1.99
σ ⎛⎞ ⎛ ⎞ = −−− = ⎜⎟ ⎜ ⎟ −− ⎝⎠ ⎝ ⎠
 In the simulations that follow, 
we use σ = 2. Their estimate of the elasticity of supply is εS = 0.5, which we apply 
to Indonesia as well.  
 
Table A.1 
Intermediation cost data, 2001 
 "Non  Fendues  Rouge"  Cuts 
                                      over 12 cm  below 12 cm   
Farmgate price  60’000  n.a.  n.a. 
Bulk buying price a/                200'000       150'000         50'000 
Transport & collectors            15'000         15'000         15'000 
Ristournes                              13'000         13'000         13'000 
Bulk Delivered:                    228'000       178'000         78'000 
Dessication  (20%)                 45'600         35'600         15'600 
Labour                                 30'000         30'000         30'000 
Management costs                35'000         35'000         35'000 
Packing                                10'500         10'500         10'500 
Price "packed"                   349'100       289'100       169'100 
Financial Interests                  31'612         26'087         15'037 
Insurance                             11'157           9'207           5'307 
Control Customs                       1'000           1'000           1'000 
FOB Costs                                3'000           3'000           3'000 
Margin (10%)                       34'900         28'910         16'910 
FOB Price                        430'769       357'304       210'354 
Source: industry data 
Notes 





We will from now on assume that  1 IM β β = − , an assumption that is 
inconsequential for the rest. The subscript on β can then be disposed of. 
Moreover, all prices (those of each variety and the composite’s) are normalized to 
unity. Thus,  
 
 
00 1 et  1 . vi PP i = =∀  (0.16) 
 
With parameters calibrated to replicate observed magnitudes as the initial 
equilibrium, the model’s equations are: 
 
1. Composite price (one equation): 
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1
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3. Demand for variety i (two equations): 
 
  ()
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σ σσ β
− − =  (0.19) 
 
4. Perceived elasticity of demand (two equations): 
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5. Mark-up (two equations): 
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This gives ten equations in ten unknowns given initial selling prices
0
1 P and 
0
2 P  
(alternatively, one could fix initial producer prices or quantities).  The ten 
endogenous variables determined in the system are Pv, Xv, XM, XI, εM, εI, nM, nI, 
p
M p  et
p




A.3 Perturbation of the initial equilibrium and results 
 
In the perturbed equilibrium, ni is fixed at a value that differs from its initial 
value, whereas PM et PI are freed. The number of equations and unknowns is thus 
unchanged. The values at which ni are fixed are respectively  1 M n =  for 
Madagascar (monopsony/monopoly) and 
*
II nn =  for Indonesia (Cournot 
assumption―no entry). We then recalculate equilibrium values for 
, , , , , and 
PP
M MII M I PpP pX X  (see Table A.2 consistent with the model’s behavioural 
assumption (Cournot) and no entry in Indonesia. We then plug back the new 
values of   and 
P
M M p X  in the household survey’s farmer-income data and 
recalculate the income distribution, poverty gap and poverty headcount. 
 
Results are reproduced in Table A.2. The baseline scenario with εS = 0.5 and σ = 
2 gives nM = X and nI = X. These low values, undoubtedly smaller than the actual 
number of traders, suggest either strong price leadership or collusion. They prove 
robust to changes in the intermediation cost in a plausible range and also to 
changes in elasticity parameters.  
 
Table A.2 
Baseline scenario and counterfactual 
Assumed parameter values 
v ε   1 2 
S ε   0.5 1  2  1 
σ   2 4 2  4  2 4  2 
Initial 
values 
Counterfactual values for endogenous variables 
1.00   
P
M p   0.02  0.02  0.04  0.06  0.09  0.11  0.02 
1.00 
P
I p   0.31  0.37  0.38  0.40  0.39  0.40  0.21 
0.22  PM  2.67  2.33  4.13  2.65  4.44  2.77  3.16 
0.42  PI  1.61  1.77  1.79  1.88  1.83  1.92  1.39 
1'213   XM  383  383  216         306  196  281  121 
458   XI  400  438  432         456  434  463  235 
  
0
M n   5.12  4.86  4.20  3.94  3.74  3.48  4.20 
   M n   1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00 
  
0
I n   9.58  8.37  6.91  5.74  5.58  4.37  6.91 
 
 
 
 